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Abstract 
The paradigm that financial markets are efficient has 
provided the intellectual backbone for the 
deregulation of the banking sector since the 1980s, 
allowing universal banks to be fully involved in 
financial markets, and investment banks to become 
involved in traditional banking. There is now 
overwhelming evidence that financial markets are 
not efficient. Bubbles and crashes are an endemic 
feature of financial markets in capitalist countries. 
Thus, as a result of deregulation, the balance sheets 
of universal banks became fully exposed to these 
bubbles and crashes, undermining the stability of the 
banking system. The Basel approach to stabilise the 
banking system has as an implicit assumption that 
financial markets are efficient, allowing us to model 
the risks universal banks take and to compute the 
required capital ratios that will minimise this risk. I 
argue that this approach is unworkable because the 
risks that matter for universal banks are tail risks, 
associated with bubbles and crashes. These cannot be 
quantified. As a result, there is only one way out, and 
that is to return to narrow banking, a model that 
emerged after the previous large-scale banking crisis 
of the 1930s but that was discarded during the 1980s 
and 1990s under the influence of the efficient market 
paradigm.  
1.  The basics of banking 
In order to analyse the causes of the banking crisis it 
is useful to start from the basics of banking. Banks 
are in the business of borrowing short and lending 
long. In doing so they provide an essential service to 
the rest of us, i.e. they create credit that allows the 
real economy to grow and expand. 
This credit creation service, however, is based on an 
inherent fragility of the banking system. If depositors 
are gripped by a collective movement of distrust and 
decide to withdraw their deposits at the same time, 
banks are unable to satisfy these withdrawals as their 
assets are illiquid. A liquidity crisis erupts.  
In normal times, when people have confidence in the 
banks, these crises do not occur. But confidence can 
quickly evaporate, for example, when one or more 
banks experience a solvency problem due to non-
performing loans. Bank runs are then possible. A 
liquidity crisis erupts that can also bring down sound 
banks. The latter become innocent bystanders that 
are hit in the same way as the insolvent banks by the 
collective movement of distrust.  
The problem does not end here. A devilish 
interaction between liquidity crisis and solvency 
crisis is set in motion. Sound banks that are hit by 
deposit withdrawals have to sell assets to confront 
these withdrawals. The ensuing fire sales lead to 
declines in asset prices, reducing the value of banks’ 
assets. This in turn erodes the equity base of the 
banks and leads to a solvency problem. The cycle 
can start again: the solvency problem of these banks 
ignites a new liquidity crisis and so on. 
The last great banking crisis occurred in the 1930s. 
Its effects were devastating for the real economy. 
Following that crisis the banking system was 
reformed fundamentally. These reforms were 
intended to make such a banking crisis impossible 
and had three essential ingredients. First, the central 
bank took on the responsibility of lender-of-last-
resort. Second, deposit insurance mechanisms were 
instituted. These two reforms aimed at eliminating 
collective movements of panic. A third reform aimed 
at preventing commercial banks from taking on too 2 | Paul De Grauwe 
many risks. In the US this took the form of the 
Glass-Steagall Act, which was introduced in 1933 
and which separated commercial banking from 
investment banking.  
Most economists thought that these reforms would 
be sufficient to produce a less fragile banking system 
and to prevent large-scale banking crises. It was not 
to be. Why? In order to answer this question it is 
useful to first discuss the concept of ‘moral hazard’. 
In most general terms, moral hazard means that 
agents who are insured will tend to take fewer 
precautions to avoid the risk against which they are 
insured. The insurance provided by central banks and 
governments in the form of lender-of-last-resort and 
deposit insurance gives bankers strong incentives to 
take more risks. To counter this, authorities have to 
supervise and regulate, very much like any private 
insurer who wants to avoid moral hazard.  
And that’s what the monetary authorities did for 
most of the post-war period. They subjected banks to 
tight regulations aimed at preventing them from 
taking on too much risk. But then something 
remarkable happened. 
2.  The efficient market paradigm  
From the 1970s on, economists were all gripped by 
the intellectual attraction of the efficient market 
paradigm. This paradigm, which originated in 
academia, also became hugely popular outside 
academia. Its main ingredients are the following:  
First, financial markets efficiently allocate savings 
towards the most promising investment projects, 
thereby maximising welfare. Second, asset prices 
reflect underlying fundamentals. As a result, bubbles 
cannot occur, and neither can crashes. History was 
reinterpreted, and those of us who thought that the 
tulip bubble in the 17
th century was the quintessential 
example of a price development unrelated to 
underlying fundamentals were told it was all driven 
by fundamentals (see Garber, 2000).  
The third ingredient of the efficient market paradigm 
is the capacity of markets for self-regulation. The 
proponents of this paradigm told us that financial 
markets can regulate themselves perfectly and that 
regulation by governments or central banks is 
unnecessary, even harmful, for as we all know 
bureaucrats and politicians always screw things up. 
All this led Greenspan to write the following poetic 
words in his autobiography: “authorities should not 
interfere with the pollinating bees of Wall Street” 
(Greenspan, 2007).  
The efficient markets paradigm was extremely 
influential. It was also seized upon by bankers to 
lobby for deregulation. If markets work so 
beautifully there was no need for regulation 
anymore. And bankers achieved their objective. 
They were progressively deregulated in the US and 
in Europe. The culmination was the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall act in 1999 by the Clinton 
administration. This allowed commercial banks to 
take on all the activities investment banks had been 
managing, e.g. the underwriting and the holding of 
securities; the development of new and risky assets 
like derivatives and complex structured credit 
products. Thus banks were allowed to take on all the 
risky activities that the Great Depression had taught 
us could lead to problems. The lessons of history 
were thus forgotten.  
The efficient market paradigm provided the 
intellectual backing for the deregulation of financial 
markets in general and the banking sector in 
particular. At about the same time financial markets 
experienced a burst of innovations. Financial 
innovations were allowed to design new financial 
products. These made it possible to repackage assets 
into different risk classes and to price these risks 
differently. It also allowed banks to securitise their 
loans, i.e. to repackage them in the form of asset-
backed securities (ABSs) and to sell these in the 
market.  
This led to the belief, very much inspired by the 
optimism of the efficient market paradigm, that 
securitisation and the development of complex 
financial products would lead to a better spread of 
risk over many more people, thereby reducing 
systemic risk and the need to supervise and regulate 
financial markets. A new era of free and 
unencumbered progress would be set in motion. 
An important side effect of securitisation was that 
each time banks sold repackaged loans they obtained 
liquidity that could be used to extend new loans that 
later on would be securitised again. This led to a 
large increase in the credit multiplier. Thus even if 
the central bank kept tight control of the money base, 
credit expansion could go on unchecked with the 
same money base. The banking sector was piling up 
different layers of credit – one on top of the other – 
allowing agents to speculate in the asset markets. All 
this undermined the control central banks had on the 
expansion of credit in the economy.  
3.  Are financial markets efficient? 
Deregulation and financial innovation promised to 
bring great welfare improvements: better risk 
spreading; lower costs of credit, benefitting firms 
who would invest more and benefitting millions of 
consumers who would have access to cheap 
mortgages. Who could resist the temptation of 
allowing these market forces to function freely 
without the unseemly interference of governments?  The Banking Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Remedies | 3 
The trouble is that financial markets are not efficient. 
We illustrate this lack of efficiency in the two 
dimensions that matter for the stability of the 
banking sector.
1 First, bubbles and crashes are an 
endemic feature of financial markets. Second, 
financial markets are incapable of regulating 
themselves. Both failures would in the end bring 
down the new banking model that had been allowed 
to emerge and that was predicated upon financial 
markets being efficient.  
3.1  Bubbles and crashes are endemic 
in financial markets 
Nobody has written a better book on the capacity of 
financial markets to generate bubbles and crashes 
than Kindleberger in his masterful “Manias, panics 
and crashes”.
2 Kindleberger showed how the history 
of capitalism is littered with episodes during which 
asset markets are caught by a speculative fever that 
pushes prices to levels unrelated to fundamental 
economic variables. But the lessons of history have 
been forgotten, also because economic history has no 
place anymore in economic education so that 
economists fresh out of school can repeat the same 
errors, unburdened by the weight of historical 
knowledge, deemed to be useless.  
Let us look at some of the bubbles and crashes that 
have littered financial markets over the last 25 years. 
Take the US stock market during 2006-2008. We 
show the Dow Jones and the Standard and Poor’s in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The Dow Jones and the S&P 500 2006-08 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance. 
                                                      
1 The empirical evidence against the efficiency of 
financial markets has been building up over the last 
decade. For useful overviews see Shleiffer (2000) and 
Shiller (2000).  
2 See Kindleberger (2005). Chancellor (1999) also 
provides a vivid account of the many bubbles and crashes 
in the history of financial markets.  
What happened in the US economy between July 
2006 and July 2007 to warrant an increase of 30% in 
the value of stocks? Or, put differently: in July 2006 
US stock market capitalisation was $11.5 trillion. 
One year later it was $15 trillion. What happened to 
the US economy to make it possible that $3.5 trillion 
was added to the value of US corporations in just one 
year? During the same year GDP increased by only 
5% ($650 billion).  
The answer is: almost nothing. Fundamentals like 
productivity growth increased at their normal rate. 
The only reasonable answer is that there was 
excessive optimism about the future of the US 
economy. Investors were caught by a wave of 
collective madness that made them believe that the 
US was on a new and permanent growth path for the 
indefinite future. Such beliefs in future wonders can 
be found in almost all bubbles in history, as is made 
vividly clear in Kindleberger’s book.  
Then came the downturn with the credit crisis. In one 
year (July 2007 to July 2008) stock prices dropped 
by 30%, destroying $3.5 trillion of value. The same 
as the amount created the year before. What 
happened? Investors finally realised that there had 
been excessive optimism. The wave turned into one 
of excessive pessimism.  
There were many other episodes of bubbles and 
crashes in the stock markets in many different 
countries. The most famous was probably the IT-
bubble at the end of the 1990s that had the same 
structure of extreme euphoria followed by 
depression. We show the evolution of the Nasdaq 
during 1999-2002 that illustrates this phenomenon. 
In one year the IT-shares tripled in value, and lost all 
of it the next year.  
Figure 2. Index of share prices, Nasdaq, 1999-2002 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance. 
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A similar story can be told about the US housing 
market. Figure 3 shows the Case-Shiller house price 
index from 2000 to 2008. During 2000-07 US house 
prices more than doubled. What happened to 
economic fundamentals in the US warranting a 
doubling of house prices in only seven years? Very 
little. Again the driving force was excessive 
optimism. Prices increased because they were 
expected to increase indefinitely into the future. This 
was also the expectation that convinced US 
consumers that building up mortgage debt would not 
create future problems.  
Figure 3. US house prices 2000-08 
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Source: Standard & Poor. 
Bubbles and crashes also occurred in foreign 
exchange markets. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this. 
They show the bubbles of the dollar (against the 
DEM) in the 1980s and 1990s respectively. What 
happened in the 1980s in the US economy to warrant 
a doubling of the price of the dollar against the DEM 
(and other currencies) from 1980 to 1985? Almost 
nothing. Economic fundamentals between the US 
and the European currencies were somewhat 
different but these differences dwarf when compared 
to the movements of the dollar. What did happen is 
that the markets were gripped by euphoria about the 
US economy. It happened again in the second half of 
the 1990s when fairy tale wonders of the US 
economy were told. Then came the crash and the 
euphoria was instantly replaced by pessimism.  
These episodes illustrate the endemic nature of 
bubbles and crashes in capitalist systems. They 
happened in the past and will continue to happen in 
the future.  
Figure 4. DEM-USD 1980-87 
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Figure 5. Euro-dollar rate 1995-2004 
Euro-dollar rate 1995-2004
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Source: De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). 
The fact that financial markets are continuously 
gripped by speculative fevers leading to bubbles and 
crashes would not have been a major problem had 
banks been prevented from getting involved in 
financial markets. However, the deregulation of the 
banking sector that started in the 1980s fully exposed 
the banks to the endemic occurrence of bubbles and 
crashes in asset markets. Because banks were 
allowed to hold the full panoply of financial assets, 
their balance sheets became extremely sensitive to 
the bubbles and crashes that gripped these assets. 
Banks’ balance sheets became the mirror images of 
the bubbles and crashes occurring in the financial 
markets.  
This is clearly illustrated in Figure 6. It shows how 
since the start of the decade the balance sheets of the 
major banks in the world exploded, reflecting the 
various bubbles that occurred at that time (housing 
bubble, stock market bubbles, commodities bubbles). The Banking Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Remedies | 5 
Figure 6. European financials’ balance sheets 
(total assets, $ bn) 
 
While commercial banks were increasingly getting 
involved in financial markets and thus taking over 
activities that were reserved to investment banks, the 
opposite occurred with investment banks. The latter 
increasingly behaved like banks, i.e. they borrowed 
short and lent long, thereby moving into the business 
of credit creation. To give an example: investment 
banks (e.g. Lehman Brothers) moved into the 
business of lending money to hedge funds and 
accepted stocks or other securities as collateral. They 
then went on and lent that collateral to others so as to 
make extra money. Thus, investment banks had 
become banks in that they were creating credit. In 
the process they created an unbalanced maturity 
structure of assets and liabilities. Their assets were 
long-term and illiquid while their liabilities had a 
very short maturity. Note the historical analogy 
between the goldsmiths who accepted gold as 
collateral for loans and ended up lending out the 
gold, thereby becoming banks. All this (the 
goldsmiths of the past and the investment banks of 
today) was done in a totally unregulated 
environment.  
Thus, as a result of deregulation a double shift 
occurred: commercial banks moved into investment 
bank territory and investment banks moved into 
commercial bank territory. This led to a situation in 
which both the universal banks and the investment 
banks built up a lethal combination of credit and 
liquidity risks. 
3.2  The illusory self-regulation of 
financial markets 
A centrepiece of the efficient market theory was that 
financial markets were capable of self-regulation, 
making government regulation redundant. And since 
bureaucrats lack the expertise and the incentives to 
regulate, government regulation was seen as harmful. 
Two mechanisms were seen as central to making 
self-regulation work. One was the role of rating 
agencies; the other was the use of mark-to-market 
rules. 
Rating agencies, so we were told, would guarantee a 
fair and objective rating of banks and their financial 
products. This is so because it was in the interest of 
rating agencies to do so. These agencies were large 
and had to protect their reputation. Without their 
reputation the value of their rating would worthless. 
So, contrary to government bureaucrats, the rating 
agents would do the best possible job to ensure that 
banks created safe financial products because it was 
in their interest to do so. The market would triumph.  
It did not happen. The reason was that there was a 
massive conflict of interest with the rating agencies. 
These both advised financial institutions on how to 
create new financial products and later on gave a 
favourable rating to the same products. Their 
incentives, instead of leading to the creation of sound 
and safe financial products were skewed towards 
producing risky and unsafe products. So much for 
the superior incentives of rating agencies.  
The other flaw in the belief that markets would 
regulate themselves was the idea of mark-to-market. 
If financial institutions used mark-to-market rules the 
discipline of the market would force them to price 
their products right. Since prices always reflected 
fundamental values mark-to-market rules would 
force financial institutions to reveal the truth about 
the value of their business, allowing investors to be 
fully informed when making investment decisions.  
The trouble here again was the efficiency of markets. 
As we have made clear, financial markets are 
regularly gripped by bubbles and crashes. In such an 
environment mark-to-market rules, instead of being a 
disciplining force, worked pro-cyclically. Thus 
during the bubble this rule told accountants that the 
massive asset price increases corresponded to real 
profits that should be recorded in the books.  
These profits, however, did not correspond to 
anything that had happened in the real economy. 
They were the result of a bubble that led to prices 
unrelated to underlying fundamentals. As a result 
mark-to-market rules exacerbated the sense of 
euphoria and intensified the bubble.  
Now the reverse is happening. Mark-to-market rules 
force massive write-downs, correcting for the 
massive overvaluations introduced the years before, 
intensifying the sense of gloom and the economic 
downturn.  
Thus the promise of the efficient market paradigm 
that financial markets would self-regulate was turned 
upside down. Unregulated financial markets carried 
the seeds of their own destruction.  6 | Paul De Grauwe 
4.  Unintended consequences of 
regulation 
The fact that financial markets do not regulate 
themselves does not mean that government 
regulation always works wonderfully. During the 
1980s and 1990s attempts were made at imposing 
capital ratios for banks in all developed countries. 
This was achieved in the Basel Accords (Basel I and 
II). It had disastrous consequences because of 
regulation arbitrage.  
Basel I was based on a risk classification of assets 
and forced banks to set capital aside against these 
assets based on their risk. For example, Basel I put a 
low risk weight on loans by banks to other financial 
institutions. This gave incentives to banks to transfer 
risky assets (e.g. structured products) which were 
given a high-risk weight by the Basel I regulation, 
off their balance sheets. These assets were 
transferred in special conduits. The funding of these 
conduits, however was often provided by the same or 
other banks. As a result bank funding of their 
activities increasingly occurred through the interbank 
market. Banks were investing in high risk assets, 
directly or indirectly, and obtained funding from the 
interbank (wholesale) market. In contrast to the 
deposits from the public, these interbank deposits 
were not guaranteed by the authorities. The building 
blocks of a future liquidity crisis were put into place.  
Figure 7 illustrates the phenomenon. It shows the 
ratios of total assets to deposits (from the public) of 
the five largest banks in a number of countries in 
2007. We observe that the total assets of banks were 
more than twice the size of the deposits. Put 
differently, in all these countries deposits from the 
public funded less than half of banks’ assets. 
Funding was increasingly done in the (volatile) 
wholesale market. As a result, banks created large 
leverage effects, i.e. they increased their return on 
capital by massive borrowing. Unfortunately, they 
failed to price the large liquidity risks implicit in 
such leveraging.  
Figure 7. Ratio of banks’ total assets to deposits (top 5 banks in each country), in 2007 
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Source: Bankscope, Eurostat. 
Another case of regulatory arbitrage would have 
equally dangerous consequences. This arbitrage 
occurred because Basel I made it possible for banks 
to treat assets that are insured as government 
securities. As a result, Basel I gave these assets a 
zero-risk weight. This feature was fully exploited by 
banks and led to the explosion of the use of CDS 
(credit default swaps), which insured the credit risk 
of banks’ financial assets. In doing so, it created the 
illusion in the banking system that the assets on their 
balance sheets carried no or a very low risk.  
This turned out to be wrong. The reason again has 
something to do with inefficiencies in financial 
markets. Financial models used to price CDS are 
based on the assumption that returns are normally 
distributed. There is one general feature in all 
financial markets, however, and that is that returns 
are not normally distributed. Returns have fat tails, The Banking Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Remedies | 7 
i.e. large changes in the prices occur with a much 
greater probability than the probability obtained from 
a normal distribution. This fat tail feature itself is 
intimately linked to the occurrence of bubbles and 
crashes. The implication of this is that models based 
on normal distributions of returns dramatically 
underestimate the probability of large shocks.  
We give an example of this phenomenon in Figure 8. 
This shows the daily changes (returns) of the Dow 
Jones Industrial since 1928 (upper pane), and we 
compare these observed returns with hypothetical 
ones that are generated by a normal distribution with 
the same standard deviation (lower panel). The 
contrast is striking.  
We have added dotted horizontal lines. These 
represent the returns five standard deviations away 
from the mean. In a world of normally distributed 
returns, an observation that deviates from the mean 
by five times the standard deviation occurs only once 
every 7000 years (given that the observations are 
daily). In reality (upper panel) such large changes 
occurred 74 times during an 80-year period.  
The models used to price credit default swaps and 
many other complex financial products massively 
underestimated this tail risk. They did not take into 
account that financial markets are regularly gripped 
by bubbles and crashes producing large changes in 
asset prices. Table 1 illustrates how spectacularly 
wrong one can be when one uses standard finance 
models that routinely assume normally distributed 
returns. We selected the six largest daily percentage 
changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average during 
October 2008 (which was a month of unusual 
turbulence in the stock markets), and asked the 
question of how frequently these changes occur, 
assuming that these events are normally distributed. 
The results are truly astonishing. There were two 
daily changes of more than 10% during the month. 
With a standard deviation of daily changes of 
1.032% (computed over the period 1971-2008) 
movements of such a magnitude can occur only once 
every 73 to 603 trillion billion years. Yet it happened 
twice during the same month. A truly miraculous 
event, for finance theorists living in a world of 
normally distributed returns. The other four changes 
during the same month of October have a somewhat 
higher frequency, but we surely did not expect these 
to happen in our lifetime. 
Our conclusion should be not that these events are 
miraculous but that our finance models are wrong. 
By assuming that changes in stock prices are 
normally distributed, these models underestimate 
risk in a spectacular way. As a result, investors have 
been misled in a very big way, believing that the 
risks they were taking were small. The risks were 
very big.  
In addition, there were no incentives to price this tail 
risk because there was implicit expectation that if 
something very bad would happen, e.g. a liquidity 
crisis (a typical tail risk) central banks would provide 
the liquidities. This created the perception in banks 
that liquidity risk was not something to worry about.  
Table 1. Six largest movements of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in October 2008 
A non-Normal October  
Date  Percentage Change (1)  Average Frequency under Normal Law (2) 
07/10/2008  -5.11%  Once in 5,345 Years 
09/10/2008  -7.33%  Once in 3,373,629,757 Years 
13/10/2008 11.08%  Once  in  603,033,610,921,669,000,000,000  (3) Years 
15/10/2008  -7.87%  Once in 171,265,623,633 Years 
22/10/2008  -5.86%  Once in 117,103 Years 
28/10/2008 10.88  Once  in  73,357,946,799,753,900,000,000  (3) Years 
(1) Daily returns from 01/01/1971 – to 31/10/2008 (Source Datastream) 
(2) The mean of the distribution is set to zero and the standard deviation computed over the whole sample 
(St. Dev. = 1.032%).  
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Figure 8. Normally distributed returns and observed daily returns in foreign exchange markets 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 1928-2008
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Random normal process
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5.  The reaction of the authorities 
The authorities of the major developed countries 
have reacted to the crisis by using three types of 
instruments.  
First, central banks have performed massive liquidity 
infusions to prevent a liquidity crisis from bringing 
down the banking system. Second, governments 
have introduced state guarantees on interbank 
deposits aimed at preventing a collapse of the 
interbank market, which would almost certainly have 
led to large scale liquidity crisis. Third, governments 
have reacted to bank failures by massive 
recapitalisations of banks, and in a number of cases 
by outright nationalisations. 
It must be said that these interventions have been 
successful in that they have prevented a collapse of 
the banking system. The issue that arises here, 
however, is whether these interventions will suffice 
to avert future crises and to bring the banking system 
back on track so that it can perform its function of 
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The fundamental problem banks face today is that 
their balance sheets are massively inflated as a result 
of their participation in consecutive bubbles. As asset 
prices tumble everywhere, banks face a period 
during which their balance sheets will shrink 
substantially. This process is unlikely to be a smooth 
one, mainly because during the shrinking the devilish 
interaction of solvency and liquidity crises will 
occur. This is likely to create a further downward 
spiral. As a result, there is as yet no floor on the 
value of the banks’ assets.  
This mechanism has two negative effects. First, the 
capitalisations performed by governments are 
unlikely to be sufficient. With every eruption of the 
solvency-liquidity downward spiral, governments 
will be called upon to provide new equity infusions 
to counter the write-downs banks are forced to 
perform. The government recapitalisation 
programmes will throw money into a black hole. 
This process is already operating. As Table 2 shows, 
as of 13 October 2008, the amount of state 
capitalisations of the major banks fell fall short of 
the write-downs performed by the same banks.  
Table 2. 
 
A second effect of the massive deleveraging of the 
banking system is that it will give strong incentives 
to banks not to extend new loans, thereby dragging 
down the real economy. How far and how long this 
will go on, nobody knows. It is not inconceivable 
that this leads to a long and protracted downward 
movement in economic activity.  
6. Short-term  solutions 
The solutions in the short-term will invariably 
involve a return of Keynesian economics. First and 
foremost governments will have to sustain aggregate 
demand by increased spending in the face of 
dwindling tax revenues. Large budget deficits will be 
inevitable and also desirable. Attempts at balancing 
government budgets would not work, as it would 
likely lead to Keynes’ savings paradox. As private 
agents attempt to increase savings (because they 
reduce their consumption plans) the decline in 
production and national income actually prevents 
them from doing so. This paradox can only be solved 
by government dissaving.  
Second, in the process of recapitalising banks, 
governments will substitute private debt for 
government debt. This also is inevitable and 
desirable. As agents distrust private debt they turn to 
government debt deemed safer. Governments will 
have to accommodate for this desire (see Hyman 
Minsky, 1986 on this).  
Third, governments and central banks will also have 
to support asset prices, in particular stock prices. The 
deleveraging process of the banking system will 
continue to put downward pressure on asset prices. 
In order to stop this, governments and central banks 
may be forced to intervene directly in stock markets 
and to buy shares. As argued earlier, without a 
programme aiming at stopping the downward spiral 
involving asset prices, the recapitalisation 
programmes that governments have started may in 
fact imply throwing money into a black hole.  
7.  Long-term solutions: a return to 
narrow banking 
Preventing the collapse of the banking system and 
making it function again are daunting tasks in the 
short run. Equally important is to start working on 
the rules for a new banking system. There are two 
ways to go forward. One can be called the Basel-
approach, the other the Glass-Steagall approach. 
The Basel approach accepts as a fait accompli that 
banks will remain universal banks, i.e. do both 
traditional and investment bank activities. This 
approach then consists of defining and implementing 
rules governing the risks that these universal banks 
can take. Its philosophy is that a suitable analysis of 
the risk profile of the banks’ asset portfolios allows 
for calculating the required capital to be used as a 
buffer against future shocks in credit risk. Once these 
minimum capital ratios are in place, credit risk 
accidents can be absorbed by the existing equity, 
preventing banks from going broke and thereby 
avoiding the devilish spillovers from solvency 
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This approach has completely failed. As was argued 
earlier, it was first implemented in the Basel I 
accord, but was massively circumvented by banks 
that profited from the loopholes in the system. Basel 
II attempted to remedy this by allowing banks to use 
internal risk models to compute their minimum 
capital ratios. The underlying assumption was that 
scientific advances in risk analysis would make it 
possible to develop a reliable method of determining 
minimum capital ratios.  
This approach at managing bank risks does not work 
and will never do so because it assumes efficiency of 
financial markets; an assumption that must be 
rejected. Banks that fully participate in the financial 
markets subject themselves to the endemic 
occurrence of bubbles and crashes. These lead to 
large-tail risks that with our present knowledge 
cannot be quantified. In addition, when a liquidity 
crisis erupts, usually triggered by solvency problems 
in one or more banks, the interaction between 
liquidity and solvency crises is set in motion. No 
minimum capital ratio can stop such a spiral. 
Perfectly solvent banks capable of showing the best 
capital ratios can be caught by that spiral eliminating 
their capital base in a few hours. The Basel approach 
does not protect the banks from this spiral (a tail 
risk). In addition, there is no prospect of gaining 
substantial knowledge about tail risks in the near 
future. The Basel approach must be abandoned.  
This leaves only one workable approach. This is a 
return to the Glass-Steagall Act approach, or put 
differently, a return to narrow banking in which the 
activities banks can engage in are narrowly 
circumscribed. In this approach banks are excluded 
from investing in equities, derivatives and complex 
structured products. Investment in such products can 
only be performed by financial institutions, 
investment banks, which are forbidden from funding 
these investments by deposits (either obtained from 
the public of from other commercial banks).  
In a nutshell a return to the Glass-Steagall Act world 
could be implemented as follows. Financial 
institutions would be forced to choose between the 
status of a commercial bank and that of investment 
bank. Only the former would be allowed to attract 
deposits from the public and from other commercial 
banks and to transform these into a loan portfolio 
with a longer maturity (duration). Commercial banks 
would benefit from the lender-of-last-resort facility 
and deposit insurance, and would be subject to the 
normal bank supervision and regulation. The other 
financial institutions that do not opt for a commercial 
bank status would have to ensure that the duration of 
their liabilities is on average at least as long as the 
duration of their assets. This would imply, for 
example, that they would not be allowed to finance 
their illiquid assets by short-term credit lines from 
commercial banks. Thus while commercial banks 
would be barred from engaging in the activities of 
investment banks, the reverse would also hold, i.e. 
investment banks would not be allowed to borrow 
short and to lend long, thereby taking on liquidity 
risks.  
Thus, we would return to the Glass-Steagall world 
where banking activities are tightly regulated and 
separated from investment banking activities. This 
also implies that commercial banks would no longer 
be allowed to sell (securitise) their loan portfolio. 
The reason is that securitisation does not eliminate 
the risk for the banks, on the contrary. First, when a 
commercial bank repackages loans it cannot 
eliminate its liability associated with these loans. 
And as we have seen, when a credit risk materialises, 
these securitised loans reappear on the balance sheets 
of the banks, greatly increasing their risks and 
undermining their capital base. Second, as argued 
earlier, securitisation leads to a build-up of the credit 
pyramid. When a bank securitises a loan, it obtains 
new liquidities that can be used to grant new loans, 
which in turn can be used to securitise further. As a 
result, a credit expansion is made possible that 
occurs outside the supervision and control of the 
central bank (which, however, will be called upon to 
buy these assets when it becomes the lender-of-last-
resort). Put differently, securitisation allows the 
credit multiplier to increase for any given level of the 
money base provided by the central bank. Credit gets 
out of control, endangering the whole banking 
system, including the central bank. It is worth 
stressing the latter point. The massive credit 
expansion made possible by securitisation also 
endangers the balance sheet of the central bank. This 
is so because in times of crisis, the central bank is 
called upon to function as a lender of last resort. As a 
result, it will be faced with the need to accept as 
collateral securitised assets that were created by 
banks. Allowing banks to securitise thus means that 
the central bank takes on a substantial part of the 
risk. 
The preceding argument also implies that the 
‘originate and distribute model’ that banks have 
increasingly used in the recent past must be 
abandoned. Recent proposals to save it by requiring 
banks to hold a fraction of the securitised assets on 
their balance sheets are inappropriate as they do not 
eliminate the risk arising from the multiplication of 
credit described in the previous paragraph.  
To conclude: banks take extraordinary risks that are 
implicitly insured by the central bank in the form of 
lender-of-last-resort. The central banks have the right 
to insist that banks minimise their credit risks. These 
cannot be eliminated completely, but they can 
certainly be contained by severely restricting the 
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of the banks to such restrictions is likely to be fierce. 
Banks are likely to argue that such a restriction will 
reduce long-term growth. Monetary authorities 
should not believe one word of this self-serving 
rhetoric. The massive expansion of credit made 
possible by deregulation has not increased long-term 
growth, it has only made the occurrence of asset 
bubbles more frequent and has been at the heart of 
the unsustainable consumption boom in the US. All 
these phenomena have undermined financial 
stability.  
A return to the Glass-Steagall world will necessitate 
a cooperative international approach. When only one 
or a few countries return to narrow banking, the 
banks of these countries will face a competitive 
disadvantage. They will loose market shares to less 
tightly regulated banks. As a result, they will have 
forceful arguments to lobby domestically against the 
tight restrictions they face. In the end, the 
governments of these countries will yield and the 
whole process of deregulation will start again.  
8. Conclusion 
The paradigm that financial markets are efficient has 
provided the intellectual backbone for the 
deregulation of the banking sector since the 1980s. 
Deregulation has made it possible for traditional 
banks to become universal banks and be fully 
involved in financial markets. As a result, these 
universal banks combine the activities of both 
traditional banks and investment banks. In addition, 
the total absence of regulation of investment banks 
has made it possible for these institutions to move in 
the direction of commercial banking, in the sense 
that they become institutions that, like traditional 
banks, fund their long-term assets by short-term 
liabilities. This double movement, i.e. commercial 
banks moving into investment bank territory and 
investment banks moving into commercial bank 
territory has led to a situation whereby both the 
universal banks and the investment banks build up a 
lethal combination of credit and liquidity risks. 
There is now overwhelming evidence that financial 
markets are not efficient. Bubbles and crashes are an 
endemic feature of financial markets in capitalist 
countries. Thus, as a result of deregulation, the 
balance sheets of universal banks became fully 
exposed to these bubbles and crashes. As a result, 
banks, which by their very nature are subject to 
liquidity risks, added large amounts of credit risks to 
their balance sheets; an explosive cocktail. 
Investment banks that traditionally take on a lot of 
credit risk (exposed as they are to the vagaries of 
financial markets) added the liquidity risks typically 
reserved to traditional banks to their balance sheets.  
The Basel approach to stabilise the banking system 
has as an implicit assumption that financial markets 
are efficient, allowing us to model the risks banks 
take and to compute the required capital ratios that 
will minimise this risk. We argue that this approach 
is unworkable because the risks that matter for banks 
are tail risks, associated with bubbles and crashes. 
These cannot be quantified. As a result, there is only 
one way out, and that is to return to narrow banking, 
a model that emerged after the previous large-scale 
banking crisis of the 1930s but that was discarded 
during the 1980s and 1990s under the influence of 
the efficient market paradigm. Application of this 
model will lead to a situation whereby the activities 
of commercial and investment banks are strictly 
separated.  
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